Following Brexit, numerous multinational businesses migrated their European Works Councils (EWCs) to Ireland. This required businesses to operate their EWC pursuant to Irish law, more specifically the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 (TICEA). The TICEA transposes EU Directive 2009/38/EC (the Directive) which provides for the establishment of EWCs to inform and consult employees on transnational matters in European multinational organisations. Over the years, concerns have been raised that the TICEA is not fit for purpose and does not provide an effective framework for resolving collective disputes.
The Charpentier -v- Verizon Ireland Limited case has brought some of these concerns into focus, being the first case in which the application of TICEA and the Directive have been considered before the Irish courts.
The case focussed in particular on Article 10.1 of the Directive (transposed by section 17 of the TICEA), which provides that “the member of the EWC shall have the means required to apply the rights arising from this Directive, to represent collectively the interests of the employees of the Community-scale undertaking or Community- scale group of undertakings.”
What happened?
The appellant, Jean-Philippe Charpentier, is the Chair of the EWC for Verizon. Verizon’s EWC is operated under the ‘subsidiary requirements’ contained in the Second Schedule to the TICEA. Unlike some other EU Member States, EWCs in Ireland do not have a distinct legal personality. Mr Charpentier therefore brought his initial claim, pursuant to section 17 of the TICEA, before the WRC in his capacity as chair of the EWC and was described by the Labour Court as having brought his complaint in a “representative capacity”.
Mr Charpentier sought to establish that Verizon:
- Was obliged to reimburse costs for EWC members attending a training event in Hamburg. He was of the view that training which had been provided by Verizon did not meet the requirements of the TICEA (under section 17(6) of TICEA which requires employers to provide appropriate training to members of the EWC without loss of wages)
- Should pay a disputed invoice of €11,200 for expert advice received from the EWC Academy in accordance with Schedule 2 of the TICEA
- Should pay the reasonable legal costs incurred in taking the claim, noting that the EWC has no financial resources of its own
What did the Labour Court decide?
On the issue of the ‘Hamburg’ training, the Labour Court found that Verizon had already provided appropriate training and therefore did not have to fund attendance at the Hamburg training.
Regarding the dispute concerning the invoice incurred for expert assistance, the Labour Court found that this was a collective dispute and therefore not within the scope of section 17(1A) of TICEA , noting that “Section 17… is not – and was not intended by the legislature – to be a means of progressing disputes that are collective in nature”.
Finally, the Labour Court referred to the question of awarding the appellant’s costs as “moot” in circumstances where the appeal was not upheld.
The Labour Court’s decision was undoubtedly welcomed by multinationals in Ireland, particularly in highlighting that employers can tighten their purse strings when it comes to covering EWC training costs that go beyond what is considered reasonable and appropriate. However, the Labour Court’s decision also shone a brighter light on the gap in the Irish legislation for dealing with EWC disputes of a collective nature. The High Court’s landmark judgment published on 14 November 2025 has gone a considerable way toward addressing this gap.
What did the High Court decide?
Mr Charpentier’s appeal to the High Court challenged the Labour Court’s findings on three key points: (i) the upholding of Verizon’s refusal to fund his attendance at the Hamburg conference; (ii) the interpretation of section 17 of the TICEA in not governing collective disputes and therefore not granting the EWC with the “means required” to apply its rights in the form of covering the costs of expert assistance; and (iii) the refusal of Mr Charpentier’s application for legal costs.
The Attorney General was joined to the appeal as a notice party signalling the significance of the case in scrutinising national law. The Attorney General’s submissions included that the Labour Court erred in law in concluding that the complaint was not within the scope of section 17.
In considering Mr Charpentier’s grounds of appeal, the High Court found as follows:
Adequacy of training: Mr Charpentier did not discharge the burden of establishing an appealable point of law from the Labour Court’s finding of fact about the adequacy of the training provided by Verizon. The Labour Court’s findings on the adequacy of the training and the consequential reasonableness of Verizon’s refusal to pay for the Hamburg Conference constituted reasonable and rational findings of fact.
Interpretation of the TICEA: The High Court highlighted that “section 17 refers to representatives and employees and members of the EWC…. This emphasis on collective interests reflects the wording of Article 10(1) of the Directive.” The interpretation of the TICEA requires consideration of the Directive and any indirect effects of the Directive, and the High Court was critical of the Labour Court’s failure to acknowledge this – noting “…one would not have been made aware of the relevance of any EU Directive or any part of EU law to the decision the court had been asked to make”. The High Court also found that the reference to “means required” in Article 10(1) and section 17(1A) is not limited to legal capacity as argued by Verizon, but encompasses any means required to apply the rights arising from the Directive including financial and material means. The Labour Court therefore erred in interpreting section 17 “narrowly” to exclude collective complaints and fell into a further error of law in failing to examine the appellant's complaint that the costs related to the expert’s advice were properly incurred by the EWC for the purpose of applying the rights arising from the Directive and to be provided by central management.
Application for costs: The High Court determined that just because the Labour Court does not normally have jurisdiction under national legislation to award costs, does not mean that it cannot be required to properly determine a costs application pursuant to legislation that implements an EU Directive. The Labour Court should have considered whether it could permit an EWC to seek agreement from central management to reimburse legal expenses on the basis that such expenses were necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 17(1A) of the TICEA, being that the members of the EWC shall have the “means required” to apply the rights conferred by the Directive. As such, the Labour Court fell into an error of law in failing to consider the appellant’s application for costs simply because the appeal had not been upheld.
Key takeaways
While there is no doubt that significant clarifications remain outstanding when it comes to the rights and obligations of EWC members under Irish law, the judgment helpfully confirms a number of key points:
- The Labour Court’s findings on the adequacy of the training provided by Verizon (and therefore its reasonable refusal to pay for the ‘Hamburg’ training) were found by the High Court to be reasoned and rational findings of fact. The appellant’s criticism that there was a lack of engagement about the training provided by Verizon, or that it fell short of the training he said was required, was not accepted. Therefore, in accordance with the Labour Court ruling, while an employer is responsible for discharging the cost of training that is reasonably required, “it is not the case that a company is required…to furnish the EWC with a blank cheque”.
- The WRC and Labour Court must take the provisions of the Directive and the principles of EU law into account in determining a claim under the TICEA.
- The wording “means required” goes much further than legal capacity. It is whatever means are “required to apply the rights arising from the Directive to collective representatives representing the interests of the employees.”
- Section 17 does not exclude collective complaints.
- The issue of whether legal expenses can be covered in a complaint under the TICEA remains to be examined and properly determined.
The High Court is due to hold a further hearing on 3 December 2025 to make final orders. It may remit the matter to the Labour Court, including to a different division, with or without directions. In any case, the impugned parts of the Labour Court’s determinations, outlined above, are set aside.
For further information in relation to this topic, please contact Aisling Muldowney, Partner, Triona Sugrue, Senior Practice Development Consultant, Emer Gilmore, Associate or any member of the ALG Employment Team.
