The Problem
You have been ripped off.
Without you knowing it, some of your suppliers got together and formed a cartel. You have paid too much. Maybe twice as much as you should have.
This is a problem whether you are a business buying inputs or a consumer buying anything.
There is a chance that the secret cartel which cheated you will never be uncovered. Cartelists often take extraordinary measures to keep their arrangements secret. They use various means to avoid detection. Cases to date have involved business executives using burner phones, intermediaries, no electronic or written communications, meetings in homes or restaurants rather than offices, fake minutes of meetings to disguise cartel meetings and even, in the lifts and the vitamins cartel cases, meetings in the middle of forests!
No one knows how many cartels there have been, but the chances are that every company and consumer on the planet have been victims at some stage of cartel behaviour.
So, if cartelists take so many steps, how are these secret cartels ever uncovered?
They come to light by various means - by accident, a pang of conscience by one of the participants, a new owner of a business who wants to clean out the bad rot in the company, a new boss or, simply, by chance.
Economies and societies are damaged by cartels so there should be some better means of uncovering them other than by pure chance.
Competition law agencies around the world – whether in Ireland, the EU, the UK or the US – have developed immunity and leniency programmes to try to uncover cartels. Under these programmes, the first cartelist to confess to a competition agency about involvement in a cartel gets 100% immunity from jail sentences and fines. The second and subsequent cartelists to bring something new to the agency may get leniency in terms of reduced penalties (e.g. 50% off) but they are still penalised.
Many people ask why should a cartelist who has ripped off customers – sometimes for decades - ever get off scot-free?
Three main reasons are given for such programmes. First, the immunity applicant reveals a cartel that would probably never be uncovered so giving them immunity ends the cartel and is “the least bad option” so it has deterrent and curtailment effects. Secondly, the cartel is uncovered meaning all the other cartelists can be punished. Thirdly, the immunity and leniency applicants could still be sued by customers for damages for their losses, so the direct victims still get compensated while most of the participants are still punished.
Societies have got so used to the idea of immunity and leniency programmes that over 80 countries – including Ireland – now have such programmes.
But these immunity and leniency programmes are still not flushing out all cartels. Agencies (including Ireland and the EU) have tried to encourage whistleblowers to come forward voluntarily and supply information but without any pecuniary reward. But change is on the way – at least, in some parts of the world. The USA thinks it might have found a solution.
A New Solution?
There is a new development which has just come over the horizon.
The new technique could uncover more cartels – cartels that might not otherwise see the light of day – because some whistleblowers are being paid bounty for their information on unknown cartels.
The US established a Whistleblower Rewards Program in July 2025. It was a joint program between the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division and the US Postal Service.
On 29 January 2026, the DOJ announced that it had paid $1 million to a whistleblower who provided information which led to a fine on a company called EBLOCK for anti-competitive behaviour.
So, the first bounty has been paid. The first whistleblower got a million dollars. With such rewards at stake, others will follow.
This was the first reward under the program. The fact that the reward was made only after six months of the program commencing demonstrates that it has worked – at least once.
The information led to a fine of $3.28m and a deferred prosecution agreement. EBLOCK had been involved in price-fixing in connection with a motor vehicle auction site (e.g., agreements on false bids to drive up prices).
The US scheme allows a whistleblower to receive a reward ranging from 15% to 30% of the money collected by the US government.
Could we see the Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) or the Irish Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) or the European Commission paying whistleblowers?
The short answer is not likely in the short term but one could never say never.
The long answer is “probably no” at least in the short term, but it is very likely that the CCPC will raise the idea in due course and propose its adoption.
It is a big issue which needs debate.
If the whistle-blower reward scheme becomes more common internationally and successful, one could see the CCPC in time calling for it. Maybe not now but the immunity and leniency programme was a slow burner for some time and eventually got adopted in stages by the Irish authorities.
The arguments in favour of adopting a whistleblower scheme are varied. Companies may be more inclined to seek immunity or leniency if they fear that an individual such as an employee, a former employee, a customer or a supplier might well be a whistleblower – the company will want to win the race for immunity. The whistleblower route is an extra source of information. It is easier and more likely that one individual will make a disclosure than a corporation reaching a “corporate decision” to seek immunity.
The arguments against such a scheme are equally varied. Some people can make whistleblowing disclosures out of spite, revenge or for mischief and it can be difficult to “prove a negative”. Untrue information can be a distraction and wasteful of the time and resources of competition agencies as well as troubling and costly for those wrongly accused. Incentivising whistleblowers with large amounts of money could result in them embellishing the truth or downright lying so as to win the “big prize”. There can be problems with multiple people seeking immunity; what if an employee hears that their employer is going to seek immunity and gets to the authority before the employer does so?
The debate is not an easy one.
If such a scheme were to be ever introduced in Ireland or the EU, it should be designed very carefully. The US scheme, for example, requires three conditions to be met. First, the whistleblower must voluntarily provide new and original information about a possible criminal breach of antitrust or competition law. That is straight forward. Secondly, the whistle-blower is only paid if the fine is at least $1 million which could stimulate embellishment of stories. Thirdly, and this is curious, the current US scheme is organised in part by the US Postal Service so it wants the alleged behaviour to have some connection with the US postal system – in the EBLOCK case, that link was very tenuous and was satisfied simply because some of the communications surrounding the breach were sent by mail and hence there was some element of mail fraud; such a link would probably not be used in Ireland or the EU.
We may be a long way from having whistleblowers or tipsters being rewarded for alerting Irish or EU competition agencies – but there will be a debate in Ireland and the EU sooner or later and it is well that policy makers and stakeholders such as business leaders start thinking about it now.
In the meantime, the US whistleblowing regime could have interesting side-effects in Ireland – there is evidence in various cases that several international cartels have involved meetings among cartelists in Ireland. So, ironically, a whistleblower in the US could cause an investigation in Ireland if there was an effect on trade in Ireland. Watch this space!
For further information in relation to this topic or any related matter, please contact Dr Vincent Power, Partner, or your usual contact on the EU & Competition team.
